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Resurrecting the Spirit of the Securities Act of 1933
Defendant, Dare To Be Great, Inc. (Dare), a wholly owned subsidiary of
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., was engaged in a pyramid selling program,'
involving sales of self-improvement courses called "Adventures." Dare's solici-
tation program consisted of finding prospects and bringing them to an "Ad-
venture Meeting," where defendant's employees, through pretentious displays
of wealth and high-pressure sales tactics, would attempt to convince the pros-
pects that success would be theirs if only they would invest in an Adventure
and become a part of the organization. Dare's program involved a pyramid
because purchasers of certain programs solicited, for a commission, new
prospects, who would then attempt to solicit additional prospects.' The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission brought suit to enjoin this scheme as violating
the federal securities laws. Since the success of the purchaser's investment
depended on the efforts of Dare's employees at the Adventure Meetings, the
SEC believed defendants were offering "investment contracts"' and, thus, securi-
ties characterized as self-improvement courses. The district court agreed and
enjoined sale of Adventures III and IV and the $1,000 Plan.4 Dare appealed
to the Ninth Circuit. Held, affirmed: Defendant's offer and sale of self-im-
provement courses constituted transactions involving unregistered "investment
contracts," where the purchasers rely primarily upon Dare's selling effort to
recover returns from their investment. SEC v. Glenn W.. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1973).
I. DEFINING "INVESTMENT CONTRACT"
The term "security," as defined in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Secu-
'According to SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387
(Nov. 30, 1971), a typical pyramid program involves a sale to purchasers, who, upon pay-
ing various fees, have the right to sell a line of products. Different types of agreements
normally are available to the investor. Generally, the larger the investment by the purchaser
or investor, the higher the commission for recruiting prospects into the program. Throughout
all such pyramid promotions, a sales talk is made emphasizing the amount of money the
purchasers can make because of their recruiting efforts. For an additional definition of a
pyramid promotion, see, e.g., Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693,
694-95 (Fla. App. 1969), aIJ'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
'Dare sold five interrelated plans. Adventures I and II, costing $300 and $700 respec-
tively, consisted of tape recordings, a tape player, and training sessions. Adventures III and
IV, costing $2000 and $5000 respectively, consisted of the materials of Adventure II, plus
additional materials and meetings, and, more importantly, the right to solicit customers for
the Adventures. The purchaser of Adventure III could solicit customers for I, II, and III.
The purchaser of Adventure IV could solicit customers for all the Adventures. Finally,
Dare offered a $1000 Plan which was similar to the Adventures; however, the purchaser
could solicit customers for the plan alone. Each purchaser received a commission based on
any plan sold as a result of his solicitations. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348
F. Supp. 766, 769 (D. Ore. 1972).
'The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77b(1) (1970), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970), contain almost identical definitions of the
word "security." As defined by both Acts, the word "security" includes "any ...investmenP
contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'
... ." (Emphasis added.) Further, the Securities Act provides that in cases where a security
is involved, the security must be registered with the SEC unless an exemption is available;
otherwise, sales of these securities violate § 5(a) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (1970).
' 348 F. Supp. at 775-76. Adventures I and II were not treated as securities, since "the
purchasers of them are not given to expect any return from them." Id. at 777.
NOTES
rides Act of 1934, includes many types of instruments, including an "invest-
ment contract." The term "investment contract" was, however, left undefined in
both the Acts themselves and their legislative histories.' Thus "investment
contract" was left to the courts for definition.' Following enactment of the
securities acts, the United States Supreme Court first construed this term
in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.' In Joiner the defendant had induced
purchases of leases by promising to drill a well on his nearby lease. Should
the defendant have struck oil, the value of all the leases would have increased.8
The Supreme Court, finding that the essence of the agreement was the buyer's
expectation of enhanced value resulting from defendant's efforts, declared
that the defendant had been selling investment contracts in violation of the
securities acts, and enjoined sales of the assignments.9
Three years later, in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,"0 the Court was again con-
fronted with the issue of whether an investment contract existed within section
2 ( 1 ) of the Securities Act of 1933." Defendant corporations, W. J. Howey Co.
and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., which were owned and operated jointly,
offered to prospective purchasers a land sales contract in a Florida citrus grove
development coupled with a long-term service contract." Purchasers were
urged to accept the service contract, in which Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.
agreed to perform all necessary labor and management in the operation of
the groves, remitting the net proceeds to the investors." Purchasers were
typically non-residents of Florida, lacking in the knowledge, skill, and equip-
ment to care for the citrus groves."4 The Court, looking to earlier state" and
'SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Also, neither the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, nor its legislative reports, define the term "investment contract."
'Id. For a discussion of state and federal cases defining the term "investment contract"
prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws, see Long, An Attempt To Return
"Investment Contracts" To The Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
135, 146-59 (1971). The first case to consider the term "investment contract" was State v.
Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), where, in return
for both a certificate holder's payment of $50 and promise to assist defendant in the sale
of its products, defendant agreed to divide pro rata among all holders of certificates 10%
of the net price for the sale of such merchandise. The court defined an investment contract
as a contract or scheme for "[tlhe placing of capital or laying out of money in a way in-
tended to secure income or profit from its employment," and concluded that defendant
offered an investment contract to the public in violation of the state Blue Sky laws. 177
N.W. at 938.
7320 U.S. 344 (1943).
8The Court acknowledged that "[wlithout the drilling of the well, no one's lease had
any value . . .... Therefore, it was the "exploration enterprise [which] was woven into
these leaseholds," and the opportunity for the purchaser to share in the discovery values,
which resulted in the investment character of the purchase. Id. at 348-49.
1 Id. at 351, 355.
'0328 U.S. 293 (1946).115 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
12328 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1946).
"As a result of defendant's apprising purchasers "that it [would) not [be) feasible to
invest in a grove unless service arrangements are made," 85% of the land sold included
service contracts with the defendant service company. The 10-year service contract, without
an option of cancellation, gave defendant service company a leasehold interest and "full and
complete" possession of the acreage. Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. was accountable to the
purchaser only for an allocation of the net profits based upon a check made at the time of
harvesting. Id.
1 Id. at 296.
"Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942); People v. White, 124
Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078 (1932); Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 Ill. App.
331 (1930); State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922); Stevens v. Liberty
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federal" decisions, found that more than the sale of real estate was involved
in Howey."' Drawing on Joiner and earlier decisions, the Supreme Court de-
fined an investment contract as:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party .... It embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits."'
The Howey view provides, in large measure, the present state of the law
concerning investment contracts." In subsequent cases courts have found the
Howey test a "workable formula"" for determining whether or not a challenged
arrangement is an investment contract. Through application of the Howey
test, pyramid sales plans where the investor expends some minimal effort have
been found not to be investment contracts." Thus, through strict application of
the Howey test, an investment contract can be evaded by adding a require-
ment that the purchaser contribute some small physical effort."
Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (Ch. 1932); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135,
153 S.E. 855 (1930); Klatt v. Guaranteed Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12, 250 N.W. 825 (1933).
For a discussion of these cases, see generally Long, supra note 6, at 146-55; Note, Franchise
Sales: Are They Sales of Securities?, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 383, 384 nn.8 & 9 (1970); Note,
Franchise Regulation Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
140, 145 n.29 (1968).
"Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944); Atherton v. United States, 128
F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1942); SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939);
SEC v. Crude Oil Corp. of America, 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1937); SEC v. Bourbon Sales
Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941);
SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1940); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F.
Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935). For a discussion of these cases, see Long, supra note 6, at
155-59.
17 The Supreme Court disregarded the form and looked to the substance, placing em-
phasis upon economic reality in an effort to broadly construe the existence of an investment
contract. The Court stated that defendant companies offered something other than a fee
simple interest in land. The investors provided the capital with no inclination to possess
or farm the land, and were attracted solely by a share in the profits; the promoters man-
aged all aspects of the enterprise. Thus, the investors' interests involved investment contracts.
328 U.S. at 298-300.
"Id. at 298-99. For criticisms of the Howey definition of an investment contract, see,
e.g., Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 94,015 (N.D. Ill. May 17,
1973); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972);
D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hayes, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. 5
70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971); State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d
105 (Hawaii 1971). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No.
9387 (Nov. 30, 1971); Long, supra note 6, at 135.
"'See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 72 n.13 (1959); United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607,
609-10 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1966); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d
435, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,960 (N.D. Ga., filed Apr. 20, 1973).
"0See, e.g., Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620, 623
(1969); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
21 SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,960 (N.D. Ga., filed
Apr. 20, 1973); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1970), error ref. n.r.e. Contra, SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F.
Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972); Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972); cf. Gallion
v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968).
" See Long, supra note 6, at 145.
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II. INVESTOR CONTROL OVER MANAGERIAL DECISIONS-
. A REALISTIC TEST
Literal application of the Howey test precludes finding that an arrangement
is an investment contract in instances where there is any involvement by the
investor beyond the mere act of investing.2 However, some courts have found
the existence of an investment contract by focusing on the "economic realities""4
of the challenged security transaction in an inquiry of whether or not the
investor, subjecting his money to the risks of an enterprise, exercises control
over the managerial decisions in the enterprise." When the investor is involved
in the managerial decisions of the enterprise, he has the right to full access
of all business information and can properly evaluate the investment risk."
However, when he does not have managerial control and its attendant access
to information, he cannot properly evaluate the many business risks involved."
Thus, a less restrictive reading of Howey allows a finding of an investment
contract where the investor does not influence the success of the enterprise,
and apparently serves the purposes for which the Securities Act of 1933 was
enacted. One of those purposes was to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary for investment decisions. 8
Several of the decisions cited as a basis for the Howey test inquired into
whether or not the investor had any control over the managerial decisions of
the enterprise.2 ' Even the language of the Howey opinion indicates that the
hallmark of an investment contract, that of a common enterprise where profits
"come solely from the efforts of others," refers to efforts in the management
of the common enterprise required for producing the anticipated return."'
"
3 See Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968);
Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 300 Ohio 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (1964).
24The district court in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., stated that "the sub-
jection of the investor's money to the risk of the enterprise over which he exercises no man-
agerial control is the basic economic reality of a security transaction." 348 F. Supp. at 773.
Accord, Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,015 (N.D. Ill. May 17,
1973); State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Hawaii 1971).
See also Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961); see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security"; Is There a More Meaning-
ful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 412 (1967).
2' See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 669-70 (10th Cit.
1972); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1969).
s' See Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903
(1965). When the investor has a direct voice in the managerial affairs of the enterprise
and "pools his money with that of others in the group; he has an equal right of control
over the project and the opportunity and right to know what is going on .... [Therefore,]
the protection of the full disclosure offered by registration is not needed as it is in cases
involving a non-participating investor." 204 N.E.2d at 809.
27 For a discussion of the various ways in which a purchaser's investment can be sub-
jected to the risks of an enterprise, see Coffey, supra note 24, at 384-96.2
1 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REGULATION OF SECURITIES, S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). The report provides that "[t]he purpose of
this bill is to protect the investing public . . . [and] that of informing the investor of the
facts concerning securities . . . offered for sale . . . and providing protection against fraud
and misrepresentation.
"The aim [of the Act] is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of
unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation . . . [and] through
crooked promotion .... "
28See, e.g., SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Moore v. Stella, 52
Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942); State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425,
427 (1922).
.. "Accord, D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
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Howey and subsequent cases have admonished those who would apply "un-
realistic and irrelevant formulae"'" in order to thwart the remedial nature of
the federal securities laws and have encouraged use of a "flexible rather than a
static principle,""2 in determining whether or not an investment contract exists.
Because of the need for a flexible principle, some courts have recognized that
the existence of a security must depend upon the degree and quality of man-
agerial control by the investor over his funds in the business.3 Therefore,
efforts expended by the investor connected with the business, "even if financi-
ally significant and plainly contributing to the success of the venture, may be
irrelevant to the existence of a security if the investor does not control the
use of his funds to a significant degree.""0
III. SEC v. GLENN W. TURNER ENTERPRISES, INC.
Several criteria had to be satisfied in order for the Ninth Circuit to determine
that defendants offered their investors securities within the meaning of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. First, the
court was faced with a determination of whether or not the defendants were
offering their prospects products and services and not securities or investments.
After scrutinizing Dare's system, as it operated, the court concluded that the
purchaser was paying for something in addition to the self-motivational ma-
terial and courses. That "something" was a promise and expectation of re-
ceiving profit from the sale of courses by Dare to the prospects whom the
purchasers brought to defendants. The court's conclusion was supported by
its finding that the prospects were given an impression of "near inevitability
of success" for the purchasers who followed Dare's direction. Thus, the
court determined that the defendants promoted an investment, which was
represented as such throughout the scheme's system of operation.
The second obstacle, or sticking point, was reconciling the fact situation in
Turner with the landmark Howey test.' The defendants argued that, upon a
comparison of Howey with Turner, it was evident that part of the economic
relationship between the purchaser and Dare involved the former. Therefore,
L. REP. 5 70,897, at 67,042 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971). See also SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387 (Nov. 30, 1971).
" SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). See also Los Angeles Trust Deed
& Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir. 1960).
"
2 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See also Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder)
BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70,897, at 67,042 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d
205, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
"
3 See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972);
Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,015, at 94,082 (N.D. Ill. May
17, 1973); Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder) BLUE SKY L. REP.
5 71,031, at 67,233 (D. Colo. 1972); D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Trans-
fer Binder) BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70,897, at 67,042 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971); State Comm'r
of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 111 (Hawaii 1971).
" SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387, at 3 (Nov. 30,
1971). See, e.g., Blackwell v. Bensten, 203 F.2d 690, 691 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed,
347 U.S. 925 (1954) (An investor, in a scheme similar to that in Howey, had the right
to furnish the management company with "directions as to the marketing of the crop on
his tract." The court found the investment to be an investment contract.)
' 474 F.2d at 479.
"' Id. at 481.
"'The court observed that "the investor, or purchaser, must .. . exert some efforts if
[Vol. 27
the defendants argued that the profits did not come "solely" from the efforts
of others, as required by the Supreme Court's definition, and, consequently,
were not within the meaning of the statutes. The court replied that the word
"solely" in the Howey definition "exactly fitted the circumstances in Howey,"38
thereby implying that a strict application of the Howey test would be inap-
propriate in Turner. This implication became more conclusive when the
court commented that the Howey test, and more specifically the phrase
"'solely' from the efforts of others," merited criticism as an "unduly restrictive
view" which would be easy "to evade.""9 Hence, the court stated that the "word
'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of
an investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to
include within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not
form, securities."4
The court reasoned that, based upon the remedial nature of the federal
securities statutes, legislative policy of providing protection to the public, and
the Supreme Court's admonitions that flexibility be accorded the definition of
security, a more realistic test for an investment contract should be used in
order to fulfill the purpose of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The
test promulgated by the court was "whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.""' Applying this
test to the facts in Turner, the court stated that even though the purchasers
exerted certain efforts in Dare's scheme,' the purchasers were in effect buying
a right to "share in the proceeds of the selling efforts of Dare."4 Thus, while
the purchasers must contribute something besides their money, they performed
merely ministerial acts, and as such were not "in any real business sense,
master[s] of [their] own destiny.""
The significant problem which arises from an application of the Turner test
is a determination of what controlling managerial efforts are the undeniably
significant ones affecting the failure or success of the enterprise. In evaluating
Turner, the court concluded that the purchasers were strictly limited to re-
cruiting prospects to attend Adventure meetings, and were prohibited from
he is to realize a return on his initial cash outlay. He must find prospects and persuade
them to attend Dare Adventure Meetings, and at least some of them must then purchase
a plan if he is to realize that return." Id. at 482.
" Id. at 481. In Howey no investor participation existed when both a land sales contract
and service contract were purchased. See also Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5J 94,015, at 94,081 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1973): "[Ilt is the opinion of this court
that the language 'solely from the efforts of others' must be read in the context of the facts
of the Howey case ...." (Emphasis in original.)
'9 474 F.2d at 482; see Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,015,
at 94,081 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1973); State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc.,
485 P.2d 105, 108 (Hawaii 1971).
40474 F.2d at 482.4 1 1d.
4In order for the purchaser to receive proceeds of sales, he "invests three things: his
money, his efforts to find prospects and bring them to the meetings, and whatever it costs
him to create an illusion of his own affluence. He invests them in Dare's get-rich-quick
scheme." Id. at 482.
4' "Those efforts are the sine quo non of the scheme; those efforts are what keeps it
going: those efforts are what produces the money which is to make the [purchaser) rich." Id.




explaining anything about what they were selling to the prospects. "The Dare
people not the purchaser-'salesmen' run the meetings and do the selling" and
the other functions in an effort to induce the prospect to purchase one of the
Adventures or the plan.45 Hence, the investor was not in a position to make
any significant effort affecting the failure or success of the enterprise.
Subsequently, the Turner test has successfully been applied in Mitzner v.
Cardet International, Inc." The district court described defendant's (Cardet)
efforts, selling franchises of quality products in the form of distributorship and
area manager licenses, as selecting, marketing, advertising, and otherwise con-
trolling the "type, quality and nature of the goods it sells.""7 The court sug-
gested that the predicament of the distributors and area managers lay in their
being "bound by any and all rules or procedures promulgated by the company
and... not.., in a position to make any meaningful or independent business
decisions.""8 Therefore, in neither Turner nor Mitzner did the investor's efforts
control the operation of the enterprise.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Turner decision is significant in several respects. First, it sets a precedent
for an attempt to control such novel schemes as pyramid sales operations, in
effect reasserting the Supreme Court's attitude in Joiner that "the reach of the
[Securities Act of 1933] does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, ate also
reached if it be proved [that they are] 'investment contracts.' ,,50 Promoters of
fraudulent schemes, such as in Turner, are placed on notice that such devices
are considered to be securities under the federal statutes, and thus subject to
registration and disclosure requirements.5' Also, Turner follows a trend of
cases" which have tried to resolve the "fundamental question whether the
1474 F.2d at 479.
48 Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 94,015 (N.D. Ill. May 17,
1973).4 1d. at 94,082.
48 Id.
48 Contra, Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (the
investor in a restaurant franchise had the power to supervise activities, including employ-
mrenrt of a manager and the right to direct the daily operations of the restaurant); Chapman
v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969) (the investor in a distributor-
ship, marketing a product, had an active role in advertising, promotion, and merchandising
activities ).50320 U.S. at 351.
51 Defendant (Dare) declared that "compliance ...with the provisions of the Securities
Acts would mean the death of [Dare] . . . . [T)his is so because the disclosure and anti-
deception provisions of the statutes would be totally inimical to the success of the promo-
tion, for it is based upon blinding potential prospects to the realities of the scheme." 348
F. Supp. at 772.
52 See, e.g., Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
5 71,031 (D. Colo. 1972); D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, [1954-1971 Transfer Binder)
BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1971). Recent cases which have found the
Turner decision persuasive are: Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lums of Ohio, Inc., CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 5 94,126 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 1973) (the agreement for a fast food restaurant
franchise did not constitute an investment contract, since the franchisee invests in the business
and is in control of it); Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,124 (3d
Cir. Aug. 20, 1973) (the Third Circuit found franchise agreements were not investment
contracts, since the investor was required to make the following efforts in the operation of
the franchise: opening a sales center, staffing it, devoting full time and best efforts to the
business, and recruiting and training area distributors).
[Vol. 27
